The Government of Assam is preparing to re-table the report of the Commission of Enquiry on Assam Disturbances, 1983, chaired by Tribhuvan Prasad Tewary, 0n 25th November 2025. Submitted in May 1984, the Tewary Report, which is more than 500 pages, has remained largely inaccessible to the public for four decades. It’s reappearance now is not only administrative; it unfolds in a political moment where questions of citizenship, settlement, land and belonging again occupy the centre of public debate and concern.
Public memory of the violence of 1983 is uneven. Some places and events, especially the catastrophic Nellie massacre, have become defining images, while other incidents across Kamrup, Nalbari, Nagaon and other districts are less discussed and have receded from public discourse. The Report itself does not treat 1983 as a single event or a single axis of conflict. It documents a shifting and locally specific pattern of violence, shaped by land pressure, settlement history, demographic anxiety, political mobilisation and administrative breakdown.
Until now the Report existed as an inaccessible bureaucratic record. With its return to the floor of the Assembly, there is a need to revisit what it contains, and also recognise its limits. This summary is intended as a tool for public reading. It does not render judgment. It situates what the Tewary Commission recorded, how it interpreted evidence and what questions it left unresolved.
The final chapter of the report states that the disturbances were not caused by the election alone, nor can the violence be understood as a straightforward communal conflict. Rather, the Report argues that long-sanding tensions about land, identity, migration and representation created a volatile climate. The Commission notes that fears expressed by many Assamese over demographic change were based on observable trends. Yet it stops short of naming any single organisation, community or institution as solely responsible. It stresses that multiple factors converged and that the unrest was shaped by historical processes rather than a single trigger.
This summary places the Report in public view at a moment when excerpts may circulate selectively.
Setting the Context of the Report
The disturbances that the Tewary Commission examined took place in the context of a long political agitation around foreigners, electoral rolls and the future of Assamese society. After the failure of talks between leaders of the Assam Movement and the Government of India in 1982, a central question emerged: could holding elections, without first resolving the issue of foreigners on the voter lists, bring political stability, or would it deepen the crisis.
On 5 January 1983, AASU and AAGSP leaders warned the Government of India that proceeding with elections without a concrete decision on the foreigners question would completely alienate large sections of the Assamese public. They said it would be like sacrificing lakhs of young people in the name of an election. The next day, on 6 January, the Election Commission of India announced that elections to the Assam Legislative Assembly in Assam would be held on 14, 17 and 20 February 1983. It also announced that the elections would be held on the existing electoral rolls, without a fresh revision.
The election thus took place on voter lists that were already at the heart of a charged political and social struggle. This context is central to the Commission’s reading of 1983. It repeatedly notes that the violence of that period did not arise in a vacuum. It grew out of older disputes over land, immigration, citizenship, development and representation that had built up over decades.
Mandate, Composition and Method of the Tewary Commission
The Government of Assam constituted the Commission of Inquiry under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 to enquire into the disturbances that occurred in Assam during the election period of 1983. T. P. Tewary, a retired IAS officer from Uttar Pradesh (UP), was appointed as the sole member of the Commission. He assumed charge in August 1983. A small secretariat and officers on special duty were appointed to assist the work.
The Commission’s mandate included:
- examining the causes and nature of the disturbances
- recording the scale of loss of life and property
- assessing how the administration handled law and order
- suggesting measures to prevent such events in future
The Commission invited affidavits from the public, political organisations and state agencies. It received large numbers of affidavits and memoranda from individuals, associations and government departments. It examined more than 250 witnesses, including senior civil and police officers, local leaders, journalists, social workers and survivors from affected villages. It travelled widely across the state, visited many sites of violence, and inspected official records such as police diaries, First Information Reports, district reports and intelligence summaries.
The report is based on this combined material: oral testimony, written affidavits, government documents and field visits. The Commission also used demographic and economic data from the census and the Election Commission, and consulted earlier official reports on Assam’s socio economic profile.
The Electoral Moment and Its Breakdown
+treats the 1983 election as a critical moment when long term tensions and immediate triggers came together. It notes that, by late 1982, public life in Assam was already marked by frequent bandhs, road blockades, and mass mobilisations. Many organisations and large sections of the population were opposed to holding elections on the existing rolls. Others argued that constitutional processes could not be held hostage to an agitation.
The Commission records that threats of boycott, intimidation of candidates, and appeals to prevent voting were widespread. At the same time, the administration and the police were under instruction to conduct the election and to maintain law and order. This produced a situation in which large parts of the population treated the election itself as illegitimate, while the state system had to carry it out.
The report notes repeated incidents in which crowds stopped vehicles carrying polling materials, obstructed polling staff, cut roads and burnt wooden bridges. In many areas, police escorts were attacked or surrounded. In some places, polling stations were burnt or damaged. Though the Commission was mandated to look into the period from January to April of 1983, it pays particular attention to the period from early February to 20 February 1983, when violence and sabotage rose sharply in several districts.
Patterns of Violence: What the Commission Observed
One of the most important contributions of the report is its careful description of the varied patterns of violence. It explicitly rejects any simple, single communal explanation.
The Report notes that the victims were not confined to one religion, ethnic or linguistic group. In some places Assamese attackers targeted Bengali-speaking people, both Hindus and Muslims. In other places, Bengali-origin groups attacked Assamese villagers. In several areas, like Gohpur, clashes took place between Assamese-speaking and Bodo-speaking communities. There were also instances where Muslims joined others in attacking fellow Muslims. The Report sums this up by saying that- “If there is a Nellie there is also a Chamaria or a Nalbari or the incidents in the area of the Kamrup Police Station. In Chowlkhowa, a section of the minority community joined hands in attacking the immigrants. There is Arno Chapori and Gohpur where the attackers and victims both were members of the majority community. Instances of this nature can be multiplied. It will thus be taking only a superficial view to give a communal colour to these disturbances” (397).
The Commission describes different kinds of incidents:
- killings and mass attacks in certain rural clusters
- arson and burning of houses and granaries
- attacks on bridges, culverts, railway tracks and government buildings
- obstruction of polling and intimidation of voters and staff
Migration, Demographic Change and Public Anxiety
The Commission devotes a significant part of its work to the question of migration and demographic change. It uses census data from 1901 to 1971, with more focus on 1951 to 1971, to examine patterns of population growth and the scale of immigration into Assam. It states that the demographic fears expressed by many Assamese witnesses were based on observable population trends. It notes unusually high rates of population increase in certain districts and sub districts, which cannot be explained by natural growth alone.
It emphasises that migration occurred over decades, involving multiple communities in different phases. The Commission also observes that the principal anxiety amongst Assamese witnesses was the fear of becoming a linguistic minority in their own state rather than a religious minority. At the same time, the Report is cautious about how migration has been counted and described. It emphasises that migration occurred over decades, involving multiple communities in different phases. The Commission also observes that the migration recorded in the period around 1971 was shaped by the inflow of Hindu refugees from East Pakistan during and after the Bangladesh war.
Taken together, the report suggests that:
- substantial migration into Assam did occur over many years
- this migration had multiple phases and communities
- the main anxiety expressed by Assamese witnesses concerned the possibility of becoming a linguistic minority in their own state, not a religious minority
The report therefore treats demographic change as a real and serious factor in the political crisis, but not as a simple story of one community against another.
Land, Chars and the Man-Land Ratio
Land is a central theme in the Commission’s analysis. It notes that Assam’s man-land ratio has steadily deteriorated, especially in riverine and densely settled areas. Cultivable land is limited by geography, erosion and flooding. At the same time, new settlements, both by older residents and by migrants, have continued in many districts.
The report identifies occupation of land by migrants as one of the greatest irritants, especially for land-poor Assamese cultivators and tribal communities. It states that any settlement of land purely in the name of the tiller, irrespective of citizenship status, would be inadvisable in the prevailing situation. It recommends that new settlement and transfer of government land in sensitive areas should be approached with caution.
Chars, or riverine islands, receive special attention. The Commission notes that many chars have become primary homes for migrants and that land use there is often shaped by informal power structures, particularly matabars and diwanis. These areas are physically hard to access, prone to erosion, and weakly administered. The report recommends that chars be brought under stricter administrative control and that land settlement policies there take into account both vulnerability and public resentment.
Economic Underdevelopment and Youth Discontent
The report does not treat the 1983 events purely as a law-and-order or communal issue. It situates them in a wider context of economic underdevelopment, limited industrialisation and long-standing unemployment. Drawing on data available at the time, it notes that employment opportunities in Assam had never kept pace with population growth. Industrial growth was modest, and many educated young people faced underemployment or lack of work.
The Commission observes that this situation created deep frustration among the younger generation. In such a climate, existing tensions over land, identity and migration could more easily take a violent turn. It sees the disturbances partly as a result of this accumulated disappointment. Communal conflict, in its view, was one of the forms in which this deeper malaise expressed itself.
Administration, Policing and Handling of Disturbances
The Report deal in detail with how the administration and the police handled the disturbances. The Commission does not use a single simple phrase like total failure, but it records serious limitations and specific lapses.
On the preparedness side, the report notes that:
- the administration identified vulnerable areas and drew up area maps
- police and civil officers held law-and-order meetings and toured sensitive villages
- instructions were issued for guarding bridges, culverts and polling materials
- control rooms were set up and wireless communication was used to pass instructions
However, as the election drew closer and tensions rose, several problems became clear:
- intelligence collection weakened as many usual sources stopped reporting
- communications were disrupted by cut lines, damaged roads and burnt bridges
- police strength was inadequate compared to the number and size of gatherings
- home guards and village defence parties were often intimidated and left their posts
In key cases, such as in parts of Nagaon and in the Nellie cluster, the Commission found that earlier warnings were not fully acted upon. Messages asking for fixed pickets in certain villages were sent but not followed through. Officers did not always bring important wireless messages to the notice of their superiors. In some instances, the report notes that if instructions had been carried out in time, later incidents might have been prevented or their scale reduced.
At the same time, the Commission also records instances of courage and sacrifice by individual officers and constables. It also records individual acts of courage by officers who attempted rescue and protection in the thick of violence.
The overall picture is one of a stressed and partly overstretched system, in which some officers acted with commitment, while others showed negligence or hesitation. The Commission is clear that structural constraints do not erase individual responsibility in specific cases.
District Level Patterns, Including Nagaon and Nellie
The report devotes separate chapters to district-wise incidents, including Nagaon, which covered the Nellie cluster at the time. It shows that Nagaon recorded a very high number of incidents, including attacks on villages, burning of houses, and damage to infrastructure. Within Nagaon, the Morigaon subdivision and police station areas such as Jagiroad, Mikirbheta and Laharighat were among the worst affected.
In the Nellie cluster and surrounding villages like Borbori, Alisinga, Basundari and others, large-scale killings of Muslims took place on 18 February 1983. The Commission records large-scale loss of life, with official estimates running into the hundreds. It traces the sequence of events before and after that day, the movement of crowds, and the response of the police and administration.
The report also notes earlier incidents in other parts of Nagaon in which groups identified as immigrant Muslims attacked areas inhabited by Assamese communities. The Advocate General’s submissions, recorded in the report, argued that some of the later attacks were reactions to previous ones, and that the disturbances should not be seen as one-sided. The Commission does not fully endorse every claim made in these submissions, but it does accept that in Nagaon there were multiple cycles of action and reaction.
Scale of Loss and Official Figures
The report includes statistical estimates of the scale of violence, but also cautions that these numbers vary due to differences in classification and reporting from district offices, police departments and special branches. The Commission itself notes that there are discrepancies between district records, police reports and state-level summaries.
According to the methods used by the Commission, the total number of recorded incidents varies depending on how they are counted. When multiple events in the same locality are treated as one incident, the number comes to 3,526. When each complaint is treated as a separate incident, the figure rises to 8,019.
The report records the following provisional figures:
- 2,072 persons killed in group clashes
- 235 persons killed in police firing
- 14 government servants killed
The number of persons rendered homeless is recorded as 2,25,951. The number of people who took shelter in relief camps is recorded as 2,48,292.
The Commission also lists the following recorded impacts:
- 1,031 incidents involving bridges and culverts
- 22 incidents of damage to railway property
- 85 incidents of tampering with railway tracks
- 22,436 private houses burnt
- 445 government buildings damaged or burnt
The Report emphasises that these figures should be read with caution. In one example noted by the Commission, the State Memorandum initially gave 1,850 deaths, whereas later reports from the Inspector General of Police (Special Branch) revised this to 2,072 after including cases of missing persons presumed dead. The Commission states that such discrepancies arose from variations in how incidents were classified and recorded across administrative levels.
For this reason, the Report does not claim to provide final or definitive casualty figures, but rather presents the numbers as recorded through available affidavits, police records and government submissions.
What the Report Concluded
On the core questions of nature and cause, the Commission reached some clear conclusions.
It held that the widespread violence during the election process of 1983 was not simply or purely communal in nature. Communal identity intersected with land disputes, demographic anxiety, economic grievances and political mobilisation in different ways in different places. The identity of victims and attackers shifted across districts and even within the same district over time.
It also held that the election itself, although it acted as a trigger and occasion, could not alone explain the outbreak. The roots, in its view, lay in longer-term historical processes: underdevelopment, land pressure, immigration, administrative neglect and loss of faith in institutions. It stopped short of assigning direct responsibility to any single organisation or community.
On law and order, it concluded that there were serious limitations in intelligence, preparedness and response. It identified specific cases of failure to act on warnings, lack of timely deployment, and poor coordination among officers. It recommended improvements in training, intelligence gathering and communication, and suggested that vulnerable areas should receive special attention from multi-disciplinary teams, including police, revenue and border administration.
What the Report Could Not Fully Address
The report is a large document, but it also has limits.
It is primarily an official inquiry. It draws heavily on state records and on the testimony of officers. While it does take statements from survivors and members of affected communities, their voices are mediated through the format of affidavits and structured examination. The report does not provide a full social history of each locality, nor does it capture the long-term personal and community trauma that followed.
It also leaves open several questions about political responsibility and chain of command beyond the district and state levels. It does not, for example, deeply analyse decision-making at the national political level, or the role of different political parties in the agitation, beyond what appears in evidence and submissions. It is cautious about drawing conclusions where the evidence is conflicting.
It is important to keep in mind both the strengths and the silences of the report: it is a key public document, but not the only possible account of 1983.